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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MULTINATIONAL
CARBON TRADING PROGRAM
VED P. NANDA

t

INTRODUCTION

This article will primarily discuss the European Union's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which it launched in
January 2005 as a market-based solution to provide incentives for curbing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.' Although this was the first comprehensive multinational greenhouse gas emissions trading program covering installations in each of the EU's then 25 member states, the United
States fifteen years earlier had initiated an innovative national sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) emissions trading program under Title IV of the Clean Air
Act amendments of 1990. 2 That program was aimed at reducing sulfur
emissions and the resulting acid rain, which "represents a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public health. ' '3 Under Title IV, the acid decomposition control program requires significant
reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions from 1980 levels.
Subsequently, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 4 which was negotiated under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change,5 established emissions reductions commitments for industrialized states to an average 5.2 percent reduction below the benchmark
1990 concentration levels by the 2008-2012 period. The Kyoto Protocol
includes international emissions trading among other "flexibility mechanisms" to help countries meet their commitments to effectuate greenVice Provost and Evans Distinguished Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G.
Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
This is an adapted version of my presentation at the Denver University Law Review's Symposium on
Global Climate Change: Integrating Environmental Justice into Policy, Regulation, and Litigation,
on February 15, 2008.
1. Council Directive 2003/87/EC 2003 O.J. (L275 25.10.2003) of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Oct. 13, 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (as amended by Council
Directive 2004/1/EC 2004 O.J. (L338 18 13.11.2004)) [hereinafter Directive 2003/87/EC].
2.
42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (2008). See generally Revisions to the Permits and Sulfur Dioxide
Allowance System Regulations Under Title IV of the Clean Air Act, available at
http://www.epa.gov/EPA-AIR/1998/August/Day-03/a20605.htm.
3.
§ 765 1(a) (U.S. Congressional finding).
4. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec.
10, 1997), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/7/Add.2 (final version), entered into force Feb. 6, 2005, reprinted in 37
I.L.M.
22
(1998)
[hereinafter
Kyoto
Protocol],
available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
See generally MICHAEL GRUB ET AL., THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL, A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999).

5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992), enteredinto force March 21, 1994 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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house gas reductions. The EU ETS is designed for EU member states to
comply collectively with their commitments to reduce emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, while the EU commitment is to be observed
collectively, the targets may vary for member states.
The U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP) is a model that has been followed by several countries, 6 as well as the Kyoto Protocol itself and the
EU. Thus it seems appropriate to briefly review the U.S. and Kyoto experiments on emissions trading before discussing the EU program.
I. U.S. AND KYOTO EMISSIONS TRADING

The Clean Air amendments of 1990 established an overall national
limit on sulfur dioxide emissions and an allowance trading program7 to
regulate S02 from power plants. The sulfur trading program was divided
into two phases-Phase I began in 1995 and Phase 1I in 2000. The nationwide ceiling on emissions by electric utilities was set at 8.90 million
tons and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was authorized to
allocate annual emissions to firms in tons per year. 8
Compliance can be achieved through an emissions allocation and
transfer system. The cap-and-trade program also extends to effectuate
reductions in nitrogen-oxide emissions. Both of these programs have
emissions monitoring rules that are stringent and impose severe penalties
that are automatically assessed if there are not enough allowances to
cover a source's emissions at the end of the year. Starting in 2000, the
program covers virtually all steam-electric utility units in the U.S.
The ARP has been considered a great success. In its 2005 Progress
Report on the ARP, the EPA stated:
After 11 years of implementation, monitoring, and assessment, the
ARP has proved to be an effective and efficient means of meeting
emission reduction goals under the Clean Air Act. A 2005 study estimated the program's benefits at $122 billion annually in9 2010,
while cost estimates are around $3 billion annually (in 2000).
Commentators Joseph A. Kruger and William A. Pizer concluded in
2004:
The U.S. SO2 program is widely acclaimed as a success. It has resulted in early emissions reductions (spurred by the program's bank6.

See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions

Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, I REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 66, 68

(2007) ("Emissions trading programs in the United States were closely followed by many in Europe
.") (referring to the UK, Danish, and Dutch systems).
7.
§ 7651b.
8. Id.§ 7651b(a)(1).
9.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM 2005
PROGRESS REPORT, available at www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progress/docs/2005report.pdf.
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ing provision), a sharp drop in acid deposition throughout the eastern
United States, and lower-than-expected costs. The structure of the
program has been influential in the design of the Kyoto framework
and the European Emissions Trading System .... 10
The Kyoto Protocol established binding reduction targets and timetables for Industrialized (Annex I) Parties, mandating that they reduce
emissions by a varying percentage below 1990 levels." It also provided
for measurement, reporting, and review of information, 12 which is an
important starting point for building a compliance regime through later
amendment. Reduction targets were set for GHGs over a five-year initial
commitment period between 2008 and 2012, to be followed by subsequent commitment periods. 13 The European Union was initially opposed
to emissions trading, which was strongly advocated by the United States
as a means of meeting the Kyoto commitments during the negotiation
phase. However, the parties compromised, and hence the Protocol included several market-based flexibility mechanisms to achieve compliance in a cost-effective manner. These mechanisms are international
emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development
Mechanism. 14
At the United States' insistence, and notwithstanding opposition
from the EU, the Protocol ultimately included the free market trading of
emissions.1 5 The "target-based" emissions trading allows Annex I developed countries to purchase emissions credits from other Annex I parties that reduce their GHGs more than required.1 6 Thus, states that emit
less than their quota of GHGs are able to sell their emissions credits to
polluting states that need them to meet their commitments.
The United States was also successful in furthering its "marketbased flexibility" approach, as the Protocol provides for Joint Implementation (JI), under which a country with an emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol is able to acquire credits for projects reducing GHG emissions or enhancing sinks in any other country with a
commitment. 17 JI projects earn Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), each
equivalent to one metric ton of CO 2.' 8 Developed countries can thus
10.
Joseph A. Kruger & William A. Pizer, Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe, The New
Grand Policy Experiment, ENVIRONMENT,
Oct.
1, 2004, at 8,
14, available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lGI -123629147.html.
11.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3, 1.
12.
See id. art. 3, 3.
13.
Id. art. 3, 1.
14.
See id. art. 6, art. 12, art. 17.
15.
Id.art. 17.
16.
See Citizens for Global Solutions, Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol,
http://www.globalsolutions.orglissues/climate-changeand kyotoprotocol (last visited Mar. 17,

2008).
17.

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6.

18.
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNEP YEAR BOOK 2008: AN OVERVIEW
OF OUR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 26, availableat http://www.unep.org/geo/yearbook/yb2008/.
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trade among themselves, provided they meet several conditions. One
such condition is that the trade must produce reductions in addition to
any that would have otherwise occurred.' 9 Also, the parties are able to
obtain credits through trading 20only if they are also taking measures to
reduce emissions domestically.
JI was directed especially at countries with economies in transition.
A supervisory committee under the direction of the states party to the
Protocol oversees the J1 mechanism. 21 Since it is only in 2008 that the
first ERUs will be issued for a crediting period,22 no project evaluation is
yet possible.
During the negotiations, the EU had argued that its member nations
should be able to share their emissions limit collectively, so long as the
overall EU reductions were met. In response, the United States was able
to persuade the negotiating parties to include a provision which allows
any group of countries to fulfill their target-based commitments jointly.23
Thus, a regional emissions trading or multinational "bubble" is permitted.
Another free market mechanism successfully advocated by the
United States and also by developing countries is the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which is designed to effectuate reductions in carbon
emissions while allowing Annex I developed countries to engage in JItype project-based credits either by governments of or private parties in
Annex I countries. 24 Thus, Annex I countries may earn credits by assisting developing countries as they reduce their emissions. Emissionreducing projects in developing countries can earn CERs that can be sold
to buyers in industrialized countries.
The credits that can be earned and traded are called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), and are measured in metric tons of CO 2
equivalent. 25 Thus, the purpose of the CDM is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development while allowing Annex I countries flexibility in meeting their emissions reduction targets under the
Protocol. Similar to JI, CDM requires emissions reductions to be supplemental to those that would have otherwise occurred without the project. CDM projects include several energy efficiency projects and those

19. Id.
20. Id.
21.
See Guidance on the Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop 13/application/pdf/cmpartsixkp.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2008).
22.

See

UNFCCC,

Joint

Implementation,

available

http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint-implementation/items/1674.php
17, 2008).
23.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4.

24.
25.

Id. art. 12.
Id.

at

(last visited Mar.
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that reduce non-CEO industrial greenhouse gases, as well as aforestation
and reforestation projects.2 6
While the CDM program was launched in November 2001, the first
project was registered about three years after that, and the first CERs
were issued in October 2005.27 An Executive Board under the direction
of the states party to the Protocol oversees the CDM. 28 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reports that 852 projects had
been registered in 49 countries as of the end of November 2007 and 2600
projects are currently in the global pipeline; the number of expected
CERs will be more than $2.5 billion by the end of 2012, while as of October 2007, $85.9 million of CERs have been issued by the CDM Executive Board. 9

II. THE EU TRADING SCHEME
As to the EU developments, with its 27 member states, trading in
carbon emissions, under which allowances and credits are bought and
sold, has become a prominent part of the EU's response to the challenge
of climate change. The aim of the EU emission trading scheme is to help
EU member states to achieve compliance with their commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol. As the European Community had ratified the Kyoto
Protocol jointly with its member states, the EU is obligated to reduce its
GHG emissions by eight percent over the 2008-2012 period, compared to
its 1990 emissions.30
The EU scheme works on a cap-and-trade basis and is designed to
result in both economic and environmental gains. And it could become a
credible and central tool for future climate mitigation following the
European Union's "Green Agenda," which was unveiled on January 23,
2008, in Brussels under the flashy title, "20 20 by 2020-Europe's Climate Change Opportunity. ' 31 This gives the EU the high moral ground
and also is likely to turn carbon emissions into a mainstream commodity.
The EU's initiative on climate change and renewable energy for
2020 began with the European Commission's proposals "calling for a
quantum leap in the EU's commitment to change. 3 2 The European Par-

26.

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 18, at 25.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 1, at 1.
See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to

the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of the Regions, 20 20 by 2020-Europe's Climate Change Opportunity, COM (2008) 30
final (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter 20 20 by 2020].
32. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact
Assessment, SEC (2008) 85/3, at 2 (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter ImpactAssessment].
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liament 33 was in support of taking definitive steps to curb greenhouse gas
emissions and developing renewable energy sources in addressing climate change. In March 2007 the European Council agreed to set precise,
legally binding targets establishing two key targets: 1) a reduction of 20
percent in GHGs by 2020 and to increase it to 30 percent if under an
international agreement other developed countries commit to "comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced countries to
contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective
capabilities"; 34 and 2) a 20 percent share of renewable energies in EU
energy consumption by 2020.35 The Council had called upon the European Commission in February "to bring forward proposals which create
the right incentives for forward-looking low-carbon investment decisions. 36
The European Council's invitation to the European Commission to
present concrete proposals for implementing a new approach to the EU
energy and climate change issues reflected an acknowledgement of and a
response to the evolving and growing public opinion in Europe that a
new European approach to energy and climate policy was needed.
Hence, there was a political consensus for the change. As the European
Commission noted:
The resolve of the European Council was a signal to our international
partners that the EU was ready to turn words into deeds. This paid
dividends at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali
in December 2007. The European Union was able to play a pivotal
role in securing agreement on the roadmap towards a new comprehensive agreement on cutting emissions to be reached by 2009. This
reinforced the EU's determination to press on with its commitment to
fighting climate change, to show that it was ready to give force to its
conviction that developed countries can and should commit to a 30 %
cut in emission levels by 2020. The EU should continue to take
the
37
lead in the negotiation of an ambitious international agreement.
The Commission responded to the Council's call by presenting
three policy proposals: 1) a proposal for a Directive on the promotion of
renewable energy; 2) a proposal for amending the EU Emissions Trading
33.

See European Parliament Resolution on Climate Change, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6_TA 0038

(2007).

34.
35.

20 20 by 2020, supranote 31, at 2.
Id.

36.
Council Conclusion of 20 February 2007, EU Objectivesfor the FurtherDevelopment of
the International Climate Regime Beyond 2012, available at http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/en/07/stO6/st06621.enO7.pdf, cited in Commission of the European Communities
Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading System
of the Community, COM (2008) 16 final 2008/0013 (COD), at 3 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.aem.cz/svse/data/080123_eu ets draflijroposal.pdf [hereinafter Commission Proposal
for a New Directive].

37.

20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 3.
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Directive reviewing the EU ETS; and 3) a proposal on sharing the member states' efforts to meet the EU GHG reduction commitment in sectors
not covered by the EU ETS, such as transport, buildings, services, agriculture, small industrial installations, and waste.38 The discussion here
will be limited to the Commission proposal relating to amendment of the
EU Emissions Trading Directive.
The Commission based its proposals on five key principles: 1) the
targets must be met and thus the proposals must be sufficiently strong
and effective to be credible, accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring
and compliance; 2) the effort required from member states must be fair;
3) the cost must be minimized; 4) the EU must continue its efforts beyond 2020 to meet the target of curbing global emissions by 50 percent
by 2050; and 5) the EU must actively promote a comprehensive international agreement to cut GHG emissions.39
The EU ETS program is to run in two phases, from 2005 through
2007 in the first phase, and in the second phase from 2008 through 2012,
which coincides with the five-year period of Kyoto commitment. The
2003 Council Directive, 40 under which EU ETS became operative, established a regulatory framework for the implementation of a mandatory
GHG allowance trading scheme in its member states so as to promote
reduction of GHG emissions in an economically efficient and costeffective manner.
To summarize selected major provisions of the Directive, operators
of installations listed under Annex I must hold a permit from a competent
authority authorizing GHG emissions. 41 Such operators are under monitoring and reporting requirements for their GHG emissions. 42 These operators must surrender allowances equal to the verified emissions of the
total emissions of the installation in each calendar year of the EU ETS.43
Each member state is required to develop a National Allocation Plan
(NAP) stating the total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate
to installations subject to approval by the Commission. 44 These allowances can be transferred between any persons in the Community. 45
Member states are required to make decisions regarding their NAP that
are consistent with their obligations under the EU and under the Kyoto
Protocol.46 Member states are required to distribute, free of charge, at

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Impact Assessment, supra note 32, at 2.
20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 4-5.
Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 1.
Id.art. 4.
Id. art. 6.2(c), (d).
Id. art. 6.2(e).
Id. art. 9.
Id.art. 12.1(a).
Id. art. 9, Annex 111.
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least 95 percent of47allowances in Phase I and at least 90 percent of allowances in Phase 11.
Thus, under EU ETS, operators are required to surrender allowances
to cover their actual GHG emissions during the previous calendar year.4 8
However, operators can trade the emission allowances they have been
allocated. 49 Companies can sell allowances if they cut their own emissions and they can buy them if they find themselves with insufficient
allowances to cover their emissions. Thus, a reduction by companies of
their emissions results in their earning an income stream from the sale of
allowances. This, it is hoped, will stimulate innovation and push change
where it is most cost-effective. However, if operators find cutting emissions more expensive than buying extra allowances, they will have to
purchase them. Each allowance gives operators the right to emit one ton
of CO 2 equivalent during a specified period. Up to five percent of allowances may be auctioned in the first phase of the program and up to ten
percent in the second phase. 0 National governments allocate allowances
to companies under this "cap-and-trade" system and the Commission
approves the national plans. 5'
Initially, in the first phase of trading period, from 2005 to 2007,
only CO 2 emissions are covered, and those also from large emitters in the
power and heat generation industry and in selected energy-intensive industrial sectors, such as combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens,
iron and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks,
ceramic, pulp, and paper. 52 Nearly 10,500 installations in the 27 member
states of the EU, accounting for around 50 percent of the EU's CO 2
emissions and about 40 percent of its overall GHG emissions are covered.53 During the second phase, from 2008 through 2012, nitrous oxide
emissions are also being included.54
The EU ETS is linked with the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms-the CDM and JI-which are project-based. Thus, European
industry can use credits from the CDM and JI to help them comply with
their obligations under the system. By allowing this linkage, the EU
provides tangible support to developing countries in their efforts to
achieve sustainable development. Also, banking and borrowing are per-

47.

Id. art. 10.

48.
49.

Id.
id.

50.

Id.

51.
Id. art. 24.
52.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE-EU EMISSIONS
TRADING: AN OPEN SYSTEM PROMOTING GLOBAL INNOVATION 7 (2007). The facts and figures in
this pertaining to the EU ETS regulatory scheme are derived from European Commission publica-

tions.
53.
54.

Id.
See Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 1, Annex II.
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missible. During the first phase, the necessary infrastructure for monitoring, reporting, and verification, including registries, was established.
After reviewing the ETS, the European Commission noted that the
ETS
needs to be strengthened and updated if it is to meet its new objectives. The incentive effect of the current ETS has been cushioned by
the generous number of allowances handed out in the first phase
(2005-2007). The structure of the ETS, with national allocation
plans, has raised the risk of distortions in terms of competition and
the internal market. The scope of the ETS, in terms of the sectors of
the economy covered and 55the gases included, has also limited its ability to drive emission cuts.
The Commission stated that its proposed amendments 56 to the EU
ETS Directive are guided by three overall objectives:
1. Fully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS to contribute to the
EU's overall greenhouse gas reduction commitments in an economically efficient manner.
2. Refining and improving the EU ETS in the light of experience
gathered.
3. Contributing to transforming Europe into a low greenhouse-gasemitting economy and creating the right incentives for forward looking low carbon investment decisions by57reinforcing a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon price signal.
As to the scope of the ETS, the Commission proposed to expand its
coverage with the inclusion of greenhouse gases other than CO 2 and all
major industrial emitters. 58 In light of its conclusion that "[t]he emissions trading system should only be extended to emissions which are
capable of being monitored, reported and verified with the same level of
accuracy as applies under the monitoring, reporting and verification requirements currently applicable under the Directive," 59 the Commission
did not include shipping. Industrial plants emitting less than 10,000 tons
of CO 2 would not have to participate in the ETS,6 ° provided alternative
measures were in place to ensure that they adequately contribute to reduction efforts.

55.
20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 5.
56. For the text of the revised Directive, see Commission Proposalfor a New Directive, supra
note 36, at 12.
57. Id.at 3.
58.
Id. at 5.
59. Id.at 4.
60. Id.at 5.
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The Commission proposed to replace the national allocation plans
by a harmonized ETS covering the whole Union having common rules.
Noting that "in the absence of comparable constraints for industry in
third countries, there may arise a risk of 'carbon leakage', i.e. relocation
of greenhouse gas emitting activities from the EU to third countries and
thereby increasing global emissions,' the Commission proposed that
the power sector would be subject to full auctioning from the start of
2013 .62 Most other industrial sectors, including aviation, would be subject to full auctioning gradually and they are to reach full auctioning by
2020.63 Member states are to handle auctioning
and their treasuries
64
would benefit by the auctioning revenues.
Noting the need for linking with other emission trading systems to
build a global carbon market, but stressing harmonization, the Commission proposed that under the new ETS,
companies will still have access to CDMs, but the use of credits generated by such mechanisms will be limited to the levels used in the
current ETS period. This would leave room for access to this
mechanism to be increased once an international agreement is
signed-central to allowing the EU to step up swiftly to the more
challenging 30% GHG reduction in the event of an international
agreement. Freeing up access to this mechanism would also be an
incentive for third countries to sign up to an international agreement,
in the knowledge
that European investment technology could flow as
65
a result.

The Commission had taken this step after noting that, while CDMs
had proved useful in cutting emissions, there was "a risk that too generous a use of CDMs can dilute the effectiveness of the ETS by increasing
the supply of credits and thereby cutting demand for allowances, and
reducing the incentive for governments and companies to promote emission reductions at home. 66
The Commission also acknowledged that since the revised ETS is to
cover less than half of the GHG emissions, the remaining emissions,
such as buildings, transport, agriculture, waste, and industrial plants falling under the threshold for inclusion in the ETS, must be covered
through national commitments under an EU framework. 67 It set the target of a 10 percent reduction in emissions from 2005 levels in these sec-

61.

Id. at 8.

62.

Id. at 15.

63.
64.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 7-9.

65.
20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 6-7; see also Commission Proposalfor a New Directive,
supra note 36, at 10-11.
66.
20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 6.

67.

Id. at 7.
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tors. 68 Although EU measures such as tougher standards on

CO 2 emissions from cars and fuel would be applicable, member states are to determine the measures to6 9be taken and sectors where they would like to
concentrate their efforts.

Thus the EU's new agenda, which must be endorsed by the European Parliament and by member states to become effective, extends the
scope of the ETS with the inclusion of greenhouse gases other than CO 2
and all other major industrial emitters. Allocations are to be reduced
year by year so as to allow for emissions covered by the ETS to be reduced by 21 percent from 2005 levels by 2020.70 Full auctioning is
aimed at making older, dirty ways of power generation, such as coal
burning, so expensive that they are prohibitive. This could encourage
new investments across the European power sector in new and cleaner
technologies, such as wind, carbon capture, and carbon sequestration.
Until now allowances were given away, which was a major shortcoming
in the first phase. In the sectors not involved in the carbon trading
scheme, such as transport, farming, and construction, national caps are to
be imposed.
Under the new agenda, the EU threatens to limit severely the trade
in certified emission reduction credits after 2012 if there is no comprehensive global successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. If no new CERs
are admitted into Europe after 2012, the UN-approved carbon reduction
projects will be severely affected, for under the new ETS companies will
still have access to the Clean Development Mechanism, but the use of
credits generated by this mechanism will be limited to the levels used in
the current ETS period. Access to this mechanism will only be increased
after an international agreement is reached.
Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission,
announcing reforms to the ETS in its third phase after 2012, said that
"Europe would not allow other countries to exploit its virtuous stance on
carbon. ''7 1 Without an international agreement, which is the best way to
tackle the problem, he added, "There is no point in Europe being tough if
it just means production shifting to countries allowing a free-for-all on
emissions. ,,72
The EU's tough measures would include forcing importers to buy
carbon permits on the ETS and restrictions on the import of additional
CER credits after 2012 unless "a satisfactory international agreement is

68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.

71.

Carl Mortished, European Move to Tighten Carbon Trade Permits Threatens UN plan,

THE TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 2008, at 44.
72.

Id.
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reached."73 That successor agreement would purportedly include the
United States, Japan, China, India, and the emerging markets, without
which the price of European carbon permits will soar.74
CONCLUSION

The carbon emission trading market for carbon quotas and credits is
very sensitive to a slowdown in economic activity, for it cuts production,
which means reduction in emissions. Unless there is a comprehensive
global agreement on the reduction of carbon emissions, the market will
remain complicated, as intense lobbying, both political and corporate,
will continue. What about the credibility of this market? Who will
monitor and police the system, effectively and intemationally?-that is,
who will verify the carbon quota and credit entitlements? Obviously it
must be done by national governments and the United Nations. The subprime mortgage crisis is a good example of the failure of the needed effective regulatory mechanism. Mechanisms should be such that a longterm, credible carbon price is achieved which encourages companies to
invest in low carbon-neutral energy generation.
What have we learned? The first phase of ETS, 2005-2007, which
the EU calls the "learning phase," was not a success story. Lobbyists
succeeded in getting the EU to allocate carbon credits and allowances to
industries too generously. Thus they did not need to buy permits. ETS
allowances were given away, resulting in what critics have characterized
as massive windfalls for energy-intensive industries.
Phase II began on January 1, 2008, and goes until 2012. It sets
tougher targets, although most allowances are still handed out free to
industry. During this phase, tighter limits are to be imposed on the number of credits allocated within Europe, but companies will still be able to
import credits from the developing countries, which provides them little
incentive to achieve emissions reductions.
Finally, the carbon market has seen considerable volatility and price
fluctuations for both CERs and allowances, although there is growing
interest among investors in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan. Consequently, both the regulated and the unregulated sectors have witnessed
a great deal of activitiy. To ensure the emergence of a healthy carbon
market, it is essential that policy-makers establish mechanisms to gather
accurate market-relevant emissions data and release it in an orderly and
transparent manner. They must set the caps consistent with the scientifically credible level of environmental performance and impose strict penalties for fraud or noncompliance
They must also give companies
maximum flexibility to achieve the emission reduction goals. Effective
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
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enforcement must also be ensured and strict penalties must be imposed
for fraud or noncompliance. The 2007 World Bank study entitled, "State
and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007" aptly stated: "The key elements
for well-functioning carbon markets include: competitive energy markets; common, fungible units of measure; standardized reporting protocols of emissions data; and transferability of assets across boundaries. 7 5

75.
KAREN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE
CARBON MARKET 2007, at 6, available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/CarbonTrends_2007FINAL_-_May_2.pdf (2007) (citation omitted).

